University of New Haven

Digital Commons @ New Haven
Political Science Faculty Publications

Political Science

Winter 1983

A Prescriptive Model for Handling Nuclear Age
Crises in the Executive Office
Joshua H. Sandman
University of New Haven, jsandman@newhaven.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/politicalsciencefacpubs
Part of the Political Science Commons
Publisher Citation
Sandman, J. H. (1983). A Prescriptive Model for Handling Nuclear Age Crises in the Executive Office. Presidential Studies Quarterly,
13(1), 121-128.

Comments
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Sandman, J. H. (1983). A Prescriptive Model for Handling Nuclear Age Crises in the
Executive Office. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 13(1), 121-128, which has been published in final form at http://www.jstor.org/stable/27547894.
This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.

A PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR HANDLING
NUCLEAR AGE CRISES IN THE EXECUTIVE
OFFICE
JOSHUA H. SANDMAN
Professor of Political Science
University of New Haven

Professor Louis Koenig writes that “crisis is a crucible in which a president and his
administration are tested as nowhere else.”1 From a study primarily of the Cuban missile
crisis and several similar type of crises2 a prescriptive model3 will be offered to provide the
President with a coherent strategy and a workable decision-making pattern to deal with
possible future nuclear age crisis4 situations.
There are several reasons and objectives for undertaking this study. President
Kennedy was aware of a deeply disturbed by the “miscalculations and misunderstandings”
of the statesmen who brought about past wars. Our initial reasons is to determine what
Kennedy did in order to avoid repeating the errors and miscalculations of these past
statesmen in his management of the missile crisis. Our second reason is to examine the
manner in which other recent Presidents have dealt with and handled similar types of
crises5.
Third, in the nuclear age, a direct confrontation between world powers may lead to
the destruction of civilization through nuclear war. The President must have available a
strategy and institutional and structural capability to cope with such a confrontation.
Fourth, the rapid and dangerous build-up of crisis in nuclear age confrontations, due
to the increased spread of communications and expansion of weapons technology, means
that decisions must be made quickly and with the assurance that all possible alternatives
have been considered.
Fifth, a nuclear age confrontation raises the challenge of providing alternatives and
prompt decisions that do not quickly escalate the risks of total destruction, management
that is handled expertly and competently, and institutions that are responsible and able to
handle assigned tasks. An approach to crisis management during nuclear age
confrontations that provides for the above factors must be developed.
Sixth, the capacity to deal with nuclear age confrontation cannot be left to the
variable of Presidential personality alone. President Kennedy’s handling of the missile crisis
confrontation avoided irreparable global damage. However, there is no assurance that in
the future we or the Russians will have the right people in the right places at the right time.

There is a crucial need to develop a nuclear age crisis capability not solely dependent on
Presidential personality factors. We must seek to provide structurally and institutionally for
those aspects of the Kennedy personality that proved so effective in handling the missile
crisis.
Finally, international tension areas continue to exist and the threat of nuclear
confrontation and global war has not appreciably abated. The questionable and irregular
nature of the “cease-fire alert” during the October 1973 Middle East War,6 the Mayaguez
confrontation,7 and the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran8 demonstrate the necessity to
pursue studies that will enable the President and his administration to better cope with
similar possible crisis situations in the nuclear age.
The prescriptive model offered here emerged from a study that called the successful
variable components from a number of nuclear age crisis situations. The Cuban missile
crisis was the basic focus of the study. The other crises studied were used to obtain a
comparative perspective to the missile crisis.
Components of the Model
The missile crisis contained all of the successful variable components of the model.
Most of the other crises, having ended in a relatively unsatisfactory manner for the
President and the key decision makers, either lacked numerous or most of the successful
variable components. Those crises that were judged to have been resolved more
successfully were found to contain a larger number of the successful variable components
of the model. Our study revealed that there were two distinct parts to the prescriptive
model that was evolved.9 The first part involved developing a “general strategy” for dealing
with nuclear age crisis.
The components of the general strategy are:
Communications
Keep open all channels of communication.
Use of improvised channels of communication.
Widen number of parties involved in communication about the crisis, thereby
maximizing time to develop all possible crisis solutions.
Pacing Crisis Events
Attempt to retard the pace of crisis events and reduce time pressure for decisionmaking.
Pursue a slow pace of diplomatic and military escalation.

The prudent application of “coercive diplomay.”10
Compel adversary to become aware of the impact of one’s resolve and firmness of
position in confronting crisis.
Dealing with Adversary
Maintain flexibility in dealing with adversary.
Maintain restraint in dealing with adversary.
Avoid forcing adversary to choose either humiliating retreats or nuclear war.
Be aware of and sensitive to political calculations, internal needs, and perspectives
of adversary.
International Law and Morality
Ensure that actions taken are in accord with a generally acceptable interpretation of
international law in order to justify and legitimize these actions.
Ensure that actions taken are morally and historically defensible for the largest
possible domestic and international audiences.
Present all evidence to world community in a clear and unequivocal manner, if
possible at a prestigious forum, which can command media attention, to unmask the
aggressive nature of adversary’s position and behavior.
Dealing with Allies
Encourage consultation and discussion with allies in order to receive the benefit of
their advice, broaden one’s perspectives, keep them informed, show respect for
them as allies and thus gain their support.
Crisis Supervision and Coordination
Have trusted, capable, and well informed aides maintain close supervision of the
entire crisis scenario and report developments.
Maintain close control and coordination between those who have the responsibility
for carrying out actions during the crisis and those who are formulating crisis plans
and policy decisions.
The second part of our model involved developing a “decision-making pattern” for
the management of nuclear age crisis.

The components of the decision-making pattern are:
Decision-Making Management Style
Use of the “collegial”11 style of Presidential management and decision-making.
Composition of the Decision-Making Body
President must be free to choose decision-making group on an “ad hoc” basis and to
change its composition relative to the specific problem under discussion.
President must be able to select advisers for decision-making group that he has
personal confidence in.
President must be able to go outside the formal decision-making body and structure
to secure advice, analysis and assistance.
President must be free to use a flexible decision-making body to deal with the crisis.
Possible inclusion in decision-making group of an “ombudsman” advocating the
greater interests of humanity in a nuclear crisis.
The President should attempt to select stress resistant people for the decisionmaking group and provide access to mental health facilities for all decision makers.12
Operations of the Decision-Making Body
Use of “multiple advocacy:13 model by decision-making body to provide diversity of
views and interests.
Decision-making group must avoid the “groupthink”14 phenomenon. There must be
encouragement of impolite and tough questioning and a willingness to differ and
disagree.
Procedures must be used to gather information and present data that goes against
current policy and majority positions.
All possible lines of advisory reasoning and thinking, however implausible, must be
explored.
Decision-making group must maintain flexibility and be able to shift positions as
events change or as new facts come to light.
Inter-Governmental Coordination

The President must make certain that those agencies, actors, and branches of
government concerned with the implementation of policy act in a cooperative and
coordinated manner.
The President must be certain to consult with and gain support of those agencies,
actors, and branches of government that are either involved with the
implementation of the policy decisions or can in some way impede the crisis
scenario.
Overview of the Model
The challenge of developing an appropriate general strategy and decision-making
pattern for a President and his aides to employ in a nuclear age crisis is great. A new
President, upon assuming office, is faced with a large and complex set of actors, agencies,
and departments about which he most likely knows relatively little. Most recent Presidents
(Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford, Jimmy
Carter and Ronald Reagan) have come to office with little prior experience in the foreign
policy decision-making process. Few were able to give the proper attention to becoming
versed in the decision-making process prior to assuming office. The policy and decisionmaking structures that do exist are often clogged with bureaucracy, are highly parochial,
and are usually quite inflexible. In the Bay of Pigs operation, coming three months after
President Kennedy assumed office, the President was ill-advised, misinformed, and misled
by the formal advisory structure. Moreover, he can be faulted for his virtual
dismemberment of the National Security Council.15 Fortunately President Kennedy had had
the time and had been able, from the conclusion of the Bay of Pigs debacle onward, to
begin developing a more effective and flexible advisory system for foreign policy decisionmaking.
President Jimmy Carter came to office without prior experience in foreign policy. He
and most of those closest to him were “sectionally contained.” He knew little about those
that had to advise him on foreign affairs. He came to Washington without intimate
knowledge of most of the actors, agencies, and departments that represent the national
security advisory structure. Further, it would appear that at the time of the attempted
hostage rescue mission he had not gotten very far in bringing under his direction, properly
coordinating, and mastering in time of crisis the most effective use of that advisory
structure.16 The prescriptive model offered here would provide Presidents such as Jimmy
Carter, as well as the others mentioned previously, and specifically would have provided
John Kennedy prior to the Bay of Pigs, an available model for use in nuclear age crises and
the overall foreign policy decision-making process.

An overview of the prescriptive model will be helpful to understanding how it can be
applied to possible, similar nuclear age crises. The “general strategy” aspect of the model
provides a President and his aides with a coherent, balanced, and constructive approach to
foreign policy strategy development within a broad spectrum of crises that may arise.
The use of the “communications” component suggest to the President the
advantages of keeping open all possible channels of communications. The use of this
approach may extend the opportunities to communicate with the adversary in a variety of
ways that may more quickly lead to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Another part of the
communications component that could prove advantageous to a President is widening the
number of parties involved in communicating about the crisis. This can help the President
in attaining additional time, during the consultation and response periods, to explore the
various options that have been presented or to deepen the search for a possible crisis
solution.
The implementation of the “pacing crisis events” component suggests to the
President what gains may be attained from a prudent use of “coercive diplomacy,” slowing
down the pace of diplomatic and military escalation. The President would be well advised
to slow down the pace of the escalation of the crisis to permit the adversaries time to
reflect on their next moves.
Further, the President should not take any extreme actions that would foreclose
other measured responses at a later time. Prudent application of coercive diplomacy could
be a most useful tool for the President. The objective of coercive diplomacy is to attain
policy goals without excessive resort to threat or force. The President should not be rushed
into making a crucial crisis decision, especially one that involves force, without using all the
time he may have available to require his decision-making group to explore all possible
aspects of the problem being faced from every possible angle.
The model also suggests to the President a useful strategy for “dealing with the
adversary.” The President should maintain flexibility and restraint when dealing with the
adversary. Further, the President must be sensitive to the calculations and internal needs
of the adversary. Both sides must have a way to retreat from unwanted confrontations.
The President should have his advisors consider what “non-aggressive” measures could be
taken in the crisis. The model outlines a number of more specific ways in which this
strategy can be implemented.
The model further suggest several useful ways in which “international law and
morality” could be used by the President to further his strategic aims. To ensure support at
home and abroad and to defend and legitimize the nation’s actions, the President must
make certain that the nation’s actions are within a generally acceptable framework of

international law and are morally and historically justifiable. Further, the President should
attempt to demonstrate the aggressive nature of the adversary’s position and behavior.
Domestic support for the President and world reaction to his actions can play important
roles in the outcome of any nuclear age crisis.
A nuclear age crisis docs not take place in a vacuum. Support of lack of support of a
nation’s allies can affect the outcome of a crisis. “Dealing with allies” is an important
component of the general strategy aspect of the prescriptive model. The model suggests
that it would be useful for the President to engage in consultation and discussions with
allies to gain the benefit of their advice, analysis, and perspectives, and hopefully to attain
their support for this actions.
A final component of the model deals with “crisis supervision and coordination.”
The President is directed to make certain that trusted, capable, and well informed aides
maintain close supervision of crisis events and developments. The problem of properly
translating the crisis scenario into correct action is vital. The President must make certain
that actions are carried out as intended. Further, the President is directed to carefully
oversee the coordination between those who are formulating crisis actions and policies and
those who must carry them out.
The “decision-making pattern” aspect of the model gives the President and his aides
an opportunity to best work out problems and generate the strongest solutions, best
manage and organize, and most effectively coordinate the decision-making process.
Further, it allows them to best implement the decisions that have been made.
The implementation of the “decision-making management style” component (use of
the collegial style of Presidential management and decision-making) offers the President
maximum opportunity to work out problems and obtain solutions, which bring together the
best aspects of diverse points of view and approaches. The President has the benefit of
constructive conflict and finding solutions that offer the strongest and most workable
approach to a problem after the best arguments have been presented, in a structured
fashion, by all contending sides.
The implementation of the “composition of the decision-making body” component
of the model offers the President a flexibility and an expanded capacity to draw advice,
counsel, judgments, insights, analysis, and general assistance from a variety of formal and
informal sources. It frees a President from the restrictions of an overly formal advisory
structure. In adopting an ad hoc style decision-making unit, the President is creating a
decision-making environment that enables him to select for the decision-making body those
people in which he has personal trust and confidence, those from whom he wants to obtain
counsel, as well as those who serve on advisory structures because of their official positions

– the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, etc. It enables the President to gather
together a broad and diverse collection of individuals who represent a “variety of personal
and bureaucratic viewpoints.” The President is free to seek out the best group of advisors
he can find without regard to political orientations or official titles. He can draw from all
sources, including a “world source,” in the person of an “ombudsman” advocating the
greater interests of humanity. He may also wish to select those whom he finds to be most
stress-resistant. This recommendation is made in conjunction with the suggestion that the
President provide mental health facilities, for times of greatest tension and stress, for all
decision makers.
The “operations of the decision-making body” component, upon implementation,
offers the President, through the creation of a multiple advocacy system, a “structured,
balanced debate” between policy advisors coming from differing areas of the
administration and, if desired, from without the administration. The President can then
also use the ad hoc decision-making unit for the three “operating principles” here
suggested by the prescriptive model – exploration, examination, and decisional analysis. It
is vital for the President and the other decision makers not to become entrapped by the
desire for “cohesiveness and concurrence-seeking tendency.” The prescriptive model
suggests how they may avoid what is referred to as the “groupthink phenomenon” through
a variety of devices. Among these devices in the encouragement of hard and probing
questioning of alternative courses of action and the reinforcement of a positive attitude
toward constructive disagreement and argument over policy matters. The model further
suggests to the President and his aides how to create a decision-making environment that
does not pre-judge or pre-determine the type of information, advice, or analysis that
reaches the decision makers. In part, creating such an environment involves gathering data
that goes against present policy and generally favored positions and explores all possible
tracks of advisory council and suggestion.
It may appear self-evident that “inter-governmental coordinator” is vital to the
handling of any foreign policy decision-making situation. However, a new President,
especially one who has not gained control of the bureaucracy or who is not very familiar
with the operations of various agencies of departments, may greatly benefit from adopting
the measures suggested in the model to aid in the implementation of policy decisions and
to avoid impeding the crisis scenario. These measures may include special attention to
creating cooperative and coordinated efforts, making certain to obtain counsel and support
of involved groups and individuals, and “bringing on board” all those who are necessary to
crisis or general foreign policy activity.
Conclusion

Much of the focus of the above analysis has been on the usefulness of the
prescriptive model to a new President. However, a President who has been in office for
some time or one who comes into office with a degree of knowledge or experience in the
foreign policy decision-making process can equally benefit from the model. No President
has an assured ability in foreign policy decision-making. Further, the variable of Presidential
personality is great. No two Presidents will react in a similar fashion to a crisis situation.
The President may also, through handicap or disability, be limited in his ability to creatively
or competently deal with a crisis situation or the foreign policy decision-making process in
general. The President may further have become overly dependent on one type of
response to foreign policy problems not applicable in a certain crisis or general situation.
For these and other similar situations, the model offers a coherent and readily
implementable general strategy and decision-making pattern. NO real or substantive
changes in the Presidential office are needed to implement the model. The component
parts of the model are of an ad hoc nature and any institutionalization of them would be a
negative rather than a positive factor to making the model work properly. The President
cannot determine the exact composition of the decision-making group until he knows what
is the nature of the crisis situation being faced. Further, the President, in organizing the
operations of the decision-making body when needed, cannot be expected to predict the
exact type of crisis situation or foreign policy problem that has developed, and cannot be
able to prepare a multiple advocacy model with a diversity of views, orientations, and
interest already laid out.
The strength of the model is in its comparatively simple and immediate application
to a crisis situation or to the overall foreign policy decision-making process. The model can
be implemented in whole or in part. The President may choose to ignore frequent
consultation or discussions with the nation’s allies or may not show high regard for making
certain that actions taken are in accord with generally acceptable standards of international
law. This approach will certainly lessen the impact of the overall application of the model.
However, it will not prevent the other component variables of the model from being
applied. The author cautions though that it is not advisable to selectively apply
components of the model. The model may also be applied or implemented at almost any
time. No prior preparation or commitment is required. The flexible, ad hoc nature of the
model means that it can be applied to a wide and diverse group of crisis or general foreign
policy-making situations in the nuclear age. Finally, the output from the model, through
any number of it component parts, may provide a set of fresh ideas and approaches to
problems that would assist and satisfy the most demanding and experienced of Presidents.
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